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THE PARADOX OF SILENCE: SOME QUESTIONS
ABOUT SILENCE AS RESISTANCE
Dorothy E. Roberts*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Margaret Montoya's article Silence and Silencing: Their
Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and
Discourse is a fascinating exploration of the many possible interpre-
tations of silence in legal arenas and discourse.' Tapping a rich
literature on silence, Professor Montoya demonstrates that silence
has many meanings. It signifies different things in different cul-
tures, and it is used in a multitude of ways by women of color.
Moreover, the meaning of silence changes depending on the con-
text. Silence is not just the absence of voice; silence is "an
interactive process" that responds to the conduct of other human
beings.2 Because dominant groups are often ignorant about si-
lence's multiple meanings, they tend to misinterpret the silences
of subordinated people.3 A central theme of Professor Montoya's
article is that both dominant and subordinated groups use lan-
guage in their interests: traditional legal discourse "produce a
centripetal force that constantly centralizes power and privilege
within the hands of those dedicated to maintaining the status
quo," while outsiders use language to "produce centrifugal forces
that decentralize and destabilize that power and privilege." 4 Profes-
sor Montoya asserts that one of the subordinating uses of language
by dominant groups is to silence outsiders.5 She also argues that
one of outsiders' tools of resistance is silence. Silence, Professor
Montoya suggests, can be deployed as an anti-subordination tool
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; Faculty Fellow, Institute for Pol-
icy Research. B.A. 1977, Yale University; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. Thanks to mi
hermana [my sister], Lisa Iglesias, for inviting me to participate in this Symposium and to
Sarah Mervine for research assistance.
1. Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in
Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 847 (2000), 33 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 263 (2000).
2. See id. at 5 MICH. J. RAcE & L. at 859, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RErOR-M at 275.
3. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 873, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 289.
4. See id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 852, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 268.
5. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 853, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 269.
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for communication.6 Thus, silence on the part of women of color
contains a paradox: our silence may be a product of oppression or
it may be a means of resistance against oppression.
I find Professor Montoya's claim that silence can be a resistance
strategy extremely enlightening and provocative. The project of
listening to the voices of outsiders and examining deviance from
dominant norms from their standpoint is one of the most impor-
tant tasks of critical scholars. We often discover that what the
dominant society labels deviance constitutes an act of resistance.
Resistance theorists restore the critical notion of human agency,
while recognizing the constraints of structure and hegemony; they
"have attempted to demonstrate that the mechanisms of social and
cultural reproduction are never complete and always meet with
partially realized elements of opposition."" Yet this scholarly pur-
suit is fraught with complications and pitfalls. I have many
questions about the notion of silence as resistance.
In Part I, I note the difficulty in distinguishing between silencing
and silence as resistance. This difficulty has often led people in
power to misinterpret the silence of people of color. Part II further
explores the complications of incorporating the study of silence
into resistance scholarship. I illustrate this complexity by discussing
the silencing of welfare mothers and the use of language by
women of color to challenge dominant medical discourse. Part III
considers Professor Montoya's proposal to use silence as a peda-
gogical tool. Continuing my examination of silence as both
liberating and accommodating, I distinguish between silence in
the classroom as a method for subverting the dominant style of
speech and silence as reinforcement of students' reluctance to ex-
press their opinions in class. Finally, using Professor Montoya's
story about racist graffiti, Part IV emphasizes that silence may con-
stitute complicity in marginalizing discourse rather than resistance
6. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 854, 33 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM at 270.
7. The work of Regina Austin and Mari Matsuda provide excellent examples of this
project. See generally Regina Austin, Black Women, Sisterhood, and the Difference/Deviance Divide,
26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 877 (1992); Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539;
Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of ldentification, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1769 (1992) [hereinafter, Austin, "The Black Community"]; MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 (1987); Mari
J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
8. Henry A. Giroux, Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Educa-
tion: A CriticalAnalysis, 53 HARV. EDUC. REv. 257, 259 (1983).
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to that discourse. In short, silence provides a fruitful yet compli-
cated arena of study for resistance scholars.
I. MISINTERPRETATIONS OF SILENCE
First, it seems very hard to distinguish between silencing from
oppression and silence as resistance to oppression. As Professor
Montoya observes, silence "is, in and of itself, ambiguous." 9 In-
deed, many of Professor Montoya's examples of silence are
misinterpretations of outsiders' nonverbal communication.' ° The
stereotype and caricature of native peoples as "the silent Indian"
arose largely from faulty and arrogant studies by White ethnogra-
phers." Peasant women in Mexico were similarly caricatured by
researchers who erased their linguistic identities through the ho-
mogenizing label of Indian. 2  Lawyers for Robyn Kina, an
Australian Aborigine charged with murdering her partner, mis-
construed their client's Aboriginal way of communicating. 3 They
were far more successful at learning Kina's story when, assisted by
the sociolinguist Diana Eades, they employed Aboriginal methods
of seeking information, including "silence, and waiting till people
are ready to give information."14 Black Americans, on the other
hand, have a tradition of deliberately using ambiguous language to
conceal their thoughts from White people.
15
Professor Montoya also uses Hernandez v. New York16 to illustrate
the discrimination against linguistic minorities that results from
9. Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 863, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at
279.
10. See infta notes 11-20.
11. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 864, 33 U. MiCH.J.L. REFORM
at 280.
12. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 867, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 283.
13. See id. at 5 MIcH.J. RACE & L. at 886-88, 33 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM at 302-04.
14. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 887, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 303 (quoting DIANA
EADES, LANGUAGE IN EVIDENCE: ISSUES CONFRONTING ABORIGINAL AND MULTICULTURAL
AUSTRALIA 27-28 (1995)).
15. See LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-
AMERICAN FOLK THOUGHT FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM at xiii (1977) (quoting slave song: "Got
one mind for white folks to see, 'Nother for what I know is me. He don't know, he don't know
my mind"); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 587, 635-36 (1993) (discussing the use of counter-stories that resist and subvert
the dominant version of reality).
16. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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misunderstanding their silence, pausing, and hesitation. 7 In
Hernandez, the United States Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos from
the jury did not violate the Latino defendant's equal protection
rights because the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation.'
8
The prosecutor justified the peremptory strikes on grounds that
the jurors hesitated when asked whether their Spanish fluency
would make it difficult for them to accept the official court
interpreter's translation. 9 Professor Montoya posits that the
prosecutor misconstrued the jurors' hesitancy-or silence-as a
negative response.2 0 This miscommunication became the basis for
excluding the Spanish-speaking jurors and denying the defendant
his right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers. These examples show
that the silence of people of color is easily and often
misunderstood.
II. ACCOMMODATION OR RESISTANCE?
This ambiguity should make scholars cautious about their own
interpretations of silence. Resistance scholarship requires us to
discern the transformative potential of what is largely a response to
subjugation.2' The distinction between what is compelled and what
is defiance is not always apparent. Moreover, some conduct that
superficially appears to oppose the dominant structure actually
supports it.22 In searching for subversive acts, we risk helping to
reproduce the social order by mistakenly valorizing behaviors that
17. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 873-79, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 289-95.
18. See id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 874, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 290 (citing
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352).
19. See id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 875, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 291 (citing
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 357 n.1).
20. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 877-79, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 293-95.
21. 1 discuss the complexities of seeing resistance in Dorothy E. Roberts, Deviance, Re-
sistance, and Love, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 179 (1994), responding to Regina Austin, "A Nation of
Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv.
147 (1994).
22. For example, some types of Black lawbreaking, such as civil disobedience of Jim
Crow laws or informal economic activity that violates city licensing laws, may subvert racist
institutions, while others, such as drug dealing in Black communities, may reinforce these
institutions. See generally Austin, "The Black Community," supra note 7.
[VOL. 5:927
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perpetuate the dominant mindset.2 3 Writing about resistance, then,
is a worthwhile but tricky business. Can we tell the difference be-
tween silence that is coerced by repression and silence that is an
act of resistance? Does outsiders' silence in response to dominant
speech challenge the status quo or simply acquiesce in it? Profes-
sor Montoya wisely counsels that we should study silence: "[W]e
can learn to hear silence in oral and written communications and
inquire into its meanings. 24 Professor Montoya is right that our
ultimate task is not to figure out a theoretical distinction between
subjugation and resistance, but to listen to those who have been
silenced so that we might learn how to work toward a more just
society.
My sense, however, is that most of the instances of silence Pro-
fessor Montoya describes reflect its subordinating rather than its
liberating aspect. Perhaps my impression arises from my familiarity
with Black women who have been punished for their refusal to
remain silent.25 Professor Montoya quotes bell hooks who also
questions the notion of silence as resistance: "Certainly for black
women, our struggle has not been to emerge from silence into
speech but to change the nature and direction of our speech, to
make a speech that compels listeners, one that is heard., 26 Thus, it
might be more fruitful for resistance scholars to explore ways of
making Black women's subversive speech more effective, rather
than focusing on their silence.
A. Silencing Welfare Mothers
Two examples of Black women's encounters with dominant dis-
course illustrate my questions about seeing silence as a form of
resistance. First, I discuss the silencing of Black welfare mothers as
part of a ritual of humiliation by the bureaucrats who supervise
23. See id. at 1780 ("A praxis based on a literal association of lawbreakers with race-war
guerillas could be justified only by a gross magnification of the damage black criminals
actually inflict on white supremacy and a gross minimization of the injuries the criminals
cause themselves and other blacks.").
24. Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 911, 33 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM at
327.
25. See infra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
26. Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 872, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at
288 (quoting bell hooks, Talking Back, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL/HACIENDO CARAS:
CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY WOMEN OF COLOR 207, 207-08 (Gloria Anzaldua
ed., 1990)).
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them. Second, I discuss the use of language by women of color to
challenge dominant medical discourse.
Dependence on the government for public assistance has sub-
jected many women of color to silencing and humiliation by state
agents.2 1 Welfare mothers have been forced to assume a submissive
stance lest offended caseworkers cut them from the rolls. Lucie
White has told the poignant story of her client's use of a submissive
identity as a survival strategy during a welfare hearing challenging
her purchase of Sunday shoes for her daughter. 9 Noncompliant
recipients risk not only financial sanctions but also brutal retalia-
tion at the hands of welfare office security guards.
30
Lucie White has also noted in another article that the litigation
process, the dominant way of settling welfare recipients' claims,
has the effect of silencing poor people. 3' The courtroom is a for-
eign setting that employs discourse to which most poor people are
not accustomed. The judges and lawyers in authority constantly
interrupt recipients' stories and interpret them according to un-
familiar rules and norms. 3 In addition, the courthouse evokes
feelings of terror for many poor people because they associate it
with jail and eviction, rather than justice.34
LaJoe, one of the mothers in Alex Kotlowitz's There Are No Chil-
dren Here, experienced such a silencing encounter when welfare
fraud investigators charged her with unlawfully sharing her apart-
ment with her husband . LaJoe barely refuted the charges because
she did not understand them or the process that was supposed to
determine her guilt or innocence: "She spoke so softly that the
27. See Lucie E. Vhite, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 861, 867 (1990) (noting the constitutional remedy in Goldberg v. Kelly "has
not compelled the government to treat recipients with dignity").
28. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes
on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1,5 (1990).
29. See id.
30. See THERESA FUNICIELLO, TYRANNY OF KINDNESS: DISMANTLING THE WELFARE
SYSTEM TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 24 (1993).
31. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients
to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 543 (1987-1988) [hereinafter White, Mobili-
zation on the Margins].
32. See id. at 542-43.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 543.
35. See ALEx KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF Two BOYS
GROWING UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA 96 (1991).
[VOL. 5:927
SPRING 2000] The Paradox of Silence 349
four inquisitors had to lean forward to hear her."36 Kotlowitz de-
scribes the silencing impact this humiliating experience had on
LaJoe:
Confused and upset, LaJoe walked silently out of the room,
slamming the door behind her. She would later apologize to
her inquisitors for her impoliteness, but she wouldn't offer
much defense against the department's charges. She didn't
deny that Paul occasionally stayed over. She didn't ask
whether she was entitled to legal counsel. She didn't ask
whether she would get money to feed her children. She
didn't ask for a caseworker to come out and look at her
home. Now, as she made her way through the labyrinth of
desks, she wondered how to break the news to the kids.
Professor White proposes that lawyers help their clients speak
out by providing "parallel spaces" outside the formal litigation
process where they can "speak their own stories of suffering, ac-
countability and change, free from the technical and strategic
constraints imposed by the courtroom."3"
B. Challenging Dominant Medical Discourse
Doctor-patient communication provides another context where
women of color have been penalized for refusing to be silent.
Professor Montoya uses research on silence in doctor-patient in-
teractions to illustrate the potential for miscommunication in
asymmetrical power relationships. 39 These studies conducted by
feminist researchers in doctors' offices confirm her hypothesis
about the dual nature of silence. Sue Fisher and Alexandra
Dundas Todd have demonstrated in their studies of doctor-patient
communications that medical decisions reflect the social and po-
litical context in which they are made. 40 Fisher and Dundas Todd
36. Id.
37. Id. at 97.
38. White, Mobilization on the Margins, supra note 31, at 546.
39. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 885--86, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 301-02.
40. See ALEXANDRA DUNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CONFLICT BE-
TWVEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 66-70 (1989) [hereinafter DUNDAS TODD,
INTIMATE ADVERSARIES]; SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST: WOMEN AND THE
POLITICS OF MEDICAL DECISIONS 17-19 (1986) [hereinafter FISHER, BEST INTEREST]; Sue
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discovered that the physician's authority shapes the way language
is used during a medical interview, often enabling physicians to
persuade and dominate women patients.
4
'
Race, class, and gender all affect the nature of these interac-
tions. Dundas Todd found in her observations of doctor-patient
encounters that "the darker a woman's skin and/or the lower her
place on the economic scale, the poorer the care and efforts at ex-
planation she received."42 These women were more likely to be
considered "difficult" and "to be talked down to, scolded, and
patronized."
43
In Reconstructing the Patient: Starting with Women of Color, I suggest
that the experience of both racism and sexism profoundly affects
the relationship women of color have to medical practice and may
encourage opposition to its oppressive aspects.4 The political di-
mension of doctor-patient communications that feminist scholars
identified is more apparent when the patient is a woman of color.)
These women receive inferior care and, because they often rely on
public clinics, they are less likely to enjoy private, protective rela-
46tionships with their doctors. Moreover, these women may be
more willing to resist medical supervision because they are more
suspicious of doctors' claims of beneficence.4 ' Thus, examining
communication between women of color and their physicians may
provide insight into modes of resistance. I do not see silence, how-
ever, as a tool these women use; rather, I see these women as
adopting a language that challenges the dominant terms of medi-
cal practice.
In her field study of the cultural meaning of prenatal diagnosis
in New York City, for example, anthropologist Rayna Rapp discov-
ered race and class variation in women's descriptions for their
Fisher & Alexandra Dundas Todd, Friendly Persuasion: Negotiating Decisions to Use Oral Contra-
ceptives, in DISCOURSE AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: MEDICINE, EDUCATION AND LAW 3
(Sue Fisher & Alexandra Dundas Todd eds., 1986) [hereinafter Fisher & Dundas Todd,
Friendly Persuasion].
41. See DUNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES, supra note 40, at 47-75; FISHER, BEST
INTEREST, supra note 40, at 59-89; Fisher & Dundas Todd, Friendly Persuasion, supra note 40,
at 3.
42. DUNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES, supra note 40, at 77.
43. id.
44. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Reconstructing the Patient: Starting with Women of Color; in
FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS 116, 117 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996).
45. See id. at 117.
46. See id.
47. See id.
[VOL. 5:927
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amniocentesis decision. 4s Most middle-class women (who were dis-
proportionately White) accepted amniocentesis in words that
resembled traditional medical language. Poorer Black women, on
the other hand, "were far less likely to either accept, or be trans-
formed by, the medical discourse of prenatal diagnosis."09 These
women often explained their decision either to use or to reject
amniocentesis in terms of nonmedical systems of interpreting their
pregnancies, including religion, visions, and folk healing. ° Rapp
concluded that "[p]aradoxically, White middle-class women are
both better served by reproductive medicine, and also more con-
trolled by it, than women of less privileged groups.
''
"1
Doctors' dismissive or even antagonistic attitudes toward pa-
tients of color may be partly retaliation for their opposition to
dominant medical norms. There is evidence, for example, that
doctors are more likely to force medical treatment upon minority
patients. A national survey published in 1987 discovered twenty-
one cases in which court orders for involuntary cesarean sections
were sought, eighty-six percent of which were grantedY. Eighty-one
percent of the women involved were women of color, and all were
treated in a teaching-hospital or were receiving public assistance. 53
Like the women in Rayna Rapp's study, some women forced to
undergo surgery explained their refusal to follow the doctor's or-
ders in nonmedical terms. For example, Jessie Mae Jefferson
rejected her doctor's recommendation of cesarean delivery be-
cause of her religious belief that "the Lord has healed her body
and that whatever happens to the child will be the Lord's will."
54
Judges and doctors often dismiss these explanations not expressed
in the dominant medical language as illegitimate. They describe
pregnant women of color who refuse medical treatment as angry,
48. See Rayna Rapp, Constructing Amniocentesis: Maternal and Medical Discourses, in UN-
CERTAIN TERMS: NEGOTIATING GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 28, 30 (Faye Ginsburg &
Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing eds., 1990).
49. Id. at 31-32.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 40.
52. See Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1192, 1192 (1987).
53. See id.; see a/soJanean Acevado Daniels, Court-Ordered Cesareans: A Growing Concern
for Indigent Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1064, 1065 (1988) (comparing general distri-
bution of cesarean sections with that of cesareans performed pursuant to court order).
54. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ga. 1981).
For a discussion of this and other forced cesarean section cases, see Lisa C. Ikemoto, The
Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting
to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIo ST. LJ. 1205, 1240-46 (1992)
[hereinafter Ikemoto, Perfect Pregnancy].
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irrational, fearful, stubborn, selfish, and uncooperative.5  The
medical model of childbirth interprets these women's words in a
way thatjustifies the doctors' control.
The paradox Rapp noted with respect to amniocentesis deci-
sions is present in the context of forced medical interventions as
well. It appears that White middle-class women more readily con-
sent to their doctors' recommendations of cesarean surgeries, even
though these surgeries are performed at excessive rates.6 Women
of color, on the other hand, appear more willing to reject their
doctors' orders, as well as the dominant medical language.5 7 I sus-
pect their opposition stems both from an alternative cultural view
of birth and their distrust of medical authority. Nancy Ehrenreich
suggests that the court-ordered treatment of women of color may
constitute a coercive response to their acts of resistance to doctors'
control of their childbearing.8
III. SILENCE AS PEDAGOGICAL TOOL
Professor Montoya proposes that law professors use silence as a
pedagogical tool to challenge the stifling effects of the dominant
communication style of the White majority.5 9 Professor Montoya
asserts that silence "can be a significant positive signal to students
of color that their language patterns are not deficient."6° Because
of silence's ambiguity, this use of silence also raises questions.
What exactly is the purpose of our deliberate use of silence?
One possibility is that by employing silence, the professor sub-
verts the dominant style of speech in law school classrooms. By
55. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medi-
cal Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. Rv. 487, 502 (1992); Rapp, supra note 48, at
33.
56. SeeCouncil on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Black-White Disparities in Health Care, 263
JAMA 2344, 2345 (1990) (reporting that five-year study of deliveries in four New York City
hospitals found that "private patients were more likely than clinic patients to have a cesar-
ean section, even though the private patients were less likely to have medical problems or to
be delivered of low-birth-weight babies"); Linda R. Monroe, Affluent Women Twice as Likely as
Poor to Have Cesarean Births, L.A. TIMES,July 27, 1989, at 3.
57. See Ikemoto, Perfect Pregnancy, supra note 54, at 501-02; Rapp, supra note 48, at 33.
58. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuKE L.J. 492, 520-65
(1993).
59. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 879-82, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 295-98.
60. Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RAcE & L. at 856, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at
272.
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breaking through the fast-paced aggressive banter, typically domi-
nated by White male students, silence allows less aggressive
students of color to compose their thoughts and to participate. A
recent opinion piece by Robert Schaeffer, the Director of Public
Education for FairTest, a group advocating testing reform, ex-
plained why virtually all the contestants on the popular game show
Who Wants to be a Millionaire are White men.6' The selection process
begins with a call-in qualifying round in which candidates are
asked three multipart general knowledge questions.62 A contestant
has only ten seconds to respond to each question by pressing the
telephone keypad.63 This type of testing is likely to favor White
men and to rule out women and people of color:
A large body of research on standardized testing shows that
responding quickly to recall-based, multiple choice items in a
high-pressure setting is a skill in which men in general, and
brash White men in particular, excel. Women do better when
time constraints are relaxed, when subtleties matter, and
when "strategic guessing" is not rewarded.64
65
The same is true for many minorities.
This insight on how standardized testing puts outsiders at a dis-
advantage supports Professor Montoya's suggestions for law
teaching. It suggests that the fast pace of law school discussions,
like standardized testing, may be more comfortable for White male
students than for others and that the pauses created by silence may
encourage female and minority students to participate more.
Another interpretation of Professor Montoya's proposal is that
professors should affirm the silence of students of color by model-
ing similar communication patterns.6 I am more skeptical of this
possible pedagogical method. I imagine many students of color
who are silent have answers and opinions racing through their
minds but are too intimidated or uncomfortable to articulate
them. Professor Montoya recounts student confessions to her
61. See Robert Schaeffer, Who Wants to Be a Contestant?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at
A15.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RAcE & L. at 879-82, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM at 295-98.
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about panic attacks caused by the fear of speaking in class. 67 Our
goal for these students of color should be to help them speak up
more rather than to encourage them to remain silent.
One reason Professor Montoya gives for the silence of students
of color is the elision of race, gender, and sexual orientation from
traditional legal reasoning. Professor Montoya explains, "[t]he si-
lencing of racialized information is largely why the law feels alien
and alienating to those for whom race or other identity character-
istics are reality-defining and often the starting point for legal
analysis." My experience in the classroom suggests that students
of color themselves can help to incorporate racialized information
into the curriculum. For the last two years I have had no African
American men in my first-year criminal law class. I notice their ab-
sence most at the very end of the course when we discuss People v.
Goetz. 69 The case concerns the reasonableness of Bernhard Goetz's
belief that deadly force was necessary when four Black teenagers
approached Goetz on a New York City subway car asking for
money. Everyone knows the issue that made this case so explosive
was whether it was reasonable for 'Goetz to take into account the
race of the teenagers in deciding that his life was in jeopardy. 70 If
no student is willing to bring this question to the forefront, I do.
But the ensuing discussion is markedly different when there are no
Black men in the class than when there are, especially if they are
willing to speak up. Black male students often add a missing per-
spective, explaining from their own experience the dangers of
using racial stereotypes about Black criminality as a basis for de-
terminations of reasonableness.
At Rutgers Law School in Newark, where I previously taught, a
strong minority student program ensured that there were always
vocal Black students in my classes. The school's affirmative action
program sought to admit a substantial number of minority and
disadvantaged White applicants. It also offered programs during
the school year to help students admitted through this process ex-
cel in class work and participate in classroom discussion and other
school activities. One year a particularly militant Black man took a
67. See id. at 5 MicH.J. RACE & L. at 882, 33 U. MicH.J.L. REFoRM at 298.
68. Id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 892, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 308.
69. 532 N.E.2d 1273 (N.Y. 1988).
70. On the reasonableness of stereotypes of Black criminality, see generally Jody D.
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntay Negro-
phobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (analyzing the proclaimed "reasonableness" of
stereotypes of Black criminality).
[VOL.. 5:927
The Paradox of Silence
SPRING 2000] The Paradox of Silence 355
White student to task for suggesting that it was reasonable for
Goetz to base his decision on racial stereotypes. He went on to in-
struct his classmates on the damaging impact this sort of thinking
has on people like him. After class, a White female student cor-
nered me to complain about how I had handled the discussion.
She advised me that I should have silenced the Black student be-
cause his comments about White racism were offensive to White
students. (Other White students, on the other hand, told me they
found the discussion enlightening.) I responded that the Black
student had added important and relevant insight on the question
of reasonableness and it would have been wrong for me to forbid
him to speak.
IV. SILENCE AS COMPLICITY
It is not clear that silence will aid in inserting forgotten aspects
of identity into the classroom discussion. Indeed, Professor
Montoya recognizes that maintaining silence about our reality in
the face of the dominant discourse is not only difficult, but may
make us "complicit in one's own marginalization. ' ' 7' Far from being
a tool of resistance, silence in the classroom or the courtroom may
be a form of accommodation.
Professor Montoya's personal story about silence and silencing
illustrates this point. Professor Montoya's response to the vicious
graffiti in the bathroom was not to remain silent. She reported the
incident to the dean.7" When she found the dean's response in-
adequate, she took further action. First she and her husband
returned to the school and covered the graffiti with black spray
paint.7 3 Then she wrote an open letter to the graffiti writer.7 4 Sig-
nificantly, she included the following statement condemning
silence: "Graffiti of the kind you wrote is hate speech and it can
only be countered by being responded to. Silence in the face of hate
speech makes us all complicit.
75
However, Professor Montoya never published the letter. Even
today, she grapples with the paradox of silence I highlight here: "It
71. Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 892, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at
308 (emphasis added).
72. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at905, 33 U. MxcH.J.L. REFoM at 321.
73. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 906, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 322.
74. See id.
75. Id.
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is hard to know what gives me greater power-holding silence or
breaking silence. 76 Reading her gripping story, I understand the
pressure to remain silent, to avoid stirring up any more attention
to the damaging words. Yet I find it hard to see silence as resis-
tance in this case. How did remaining silent give her "greater
power"? In the end, Professor Montoya concludes that her silence
was not voluntary, but the very objective of the graffiti writer. 7 She
states that, were the incident to happen today, she would broadcast
the offending words rather than keep quiet about them.78 Thus,
although Professor Montoya considers the possibility that holding
silence might be a form of resistance, she concludes that in this
instance silence constituted just the opposite-complicity with the
very forces that sought to degrade her.
Professor Montoya's story about the graffiti illustrates perfectly
the risks inherent in interpreting silence as a form of resistance. It
might be tempting to see her silence as a voluntary response that
gave her power against the perpetrator's act of subordination. But
Professor Montoya's subsequent reflections reveal that this misin-
terprets her ambiguous reaction. In fact, her silence was not an act
of defiance, but a silencing intended by the writer. Acquiescence in
the will of the oppressor by maintaining silence can even consti-
tute complicitous participation in one's own subordination. This
does not mean that silence is never an act of resistance. But Profes-
sor Montoya's experience highlights the care scholars must take in
interpreting silence as resistance.
CONCLUSION
Professor Montoya includes in her essay a strong message
against silence: "We must learn to talk about the deep issues in law
and culture, to openly debate them rather than smother them in
silence." 79 This will only happen when our students of color speak
up and resist the silencing impact of the dominant discourse. Al-
though silence may sometimes be a means of resistance, silence is
often the very objective of subordinating forces. Remaining silent
in the face of injustice may even turn people into accomplices in
76. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 907, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFoRM at 323.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 908, 33 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM at 324.
79. Id. at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 894, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 310 (quoting Dirk
Tillotson, Constitutional Eracism (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)).
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injustice. Black women's experience in welfare and doctors' offices
shows that silencing is a powerful tool to reinforce subordination,
while language can be a powerful tool to resist the dominant
mindset. As scholars, we must be attendant to the risks of misinter-
preting silence. As professors, we must study our students' modes
of communication to determine which perpetuate their own si-
lencing and which resist it. We must develop a repertoire of
pedagogical tools, including silence, to help them resist more. Pro-
fessor Montoya's thoughtful exegesis on silence makes an
important contribution to this project.

